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COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE SCOPE
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
INTRODUCTION

The City of Detroit, embroiled in a labor dispute with its policemen during the summer of 1970, ultimately reached an impasse
with contract negotiators representing these discontented municipal
employees. Pursuant to statutory procedures pertaining to the resolution of bargaining stalemates, the parties were required to submit
the unresolved issues to final and binding compulsory arbitration.'
Despite Detroit's precarious fiscal condition, the arbitrators
awarded the police a substantial salary increase. 2 To satisfy the
financial burden created by the award, the city announced a major
austerity plan under which workers from other unions were laid off
and all city employees had their workweek increased from 35 to 40
hours. As a result of the layoff, Detroit teetered on the brink of a
strike by all city employees. 3 The award to the city's policemen
encouraged other municipal employees to refrain from settling their
contract disputes with the city and eventually precipitated the 1971
Detroit sanitation workers' strike.4
The preceding facts comprise a well-known episode in the relatively short life of public sector compulsory arbitration. 5 Citing the
No. 312, 1969 Mich. Pub. Acts 602 (current version at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.231
-.247 (Supp. 1977)).
2 The policemen's union was awarded a salary increase of over 10% for officers with more
than 4 years service. The arbitration panel decided that the policemen were entitled to the
fair value of their services and hence should not have to subsidize the city. Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit (July 1, 1970) (Haber, Arb.), excerpted in R. SMrrH, H.
EDWARDS, & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBuC SECTOR 833-34 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as LABOR RELATIONS].
3GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 361, at B-9 (Aug. 10, 1970). See also Block, Criteria
in Public Sector Interest Disputes, in ARBrrRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST - PROCEEDINGS
OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING - NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 161, 172
(1971).
1 See GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 401, at B-15 (May 17, 1971). See also id. No.
361, at B-9 to B-10 (Aug. 10, 1970).
5 For purposes of this Note, use of the word "arbitration" refers to interest arbitration
unless otherwise specified. Interest arbitration has been defined as "the arbitration of a
dispute of interest, which involves the negotiation of a new, collective agreement (contract)
or revision of such an agreement." N.J. PUB. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE REL. STUDY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 143 (1976) [hereinafter cited as N.J. REPORT].
Compulsory interest arbitration is that which is mandated by statute. If the arbitration is
"binding," the parties are obligated to comply with the terms of the award.
Interest arbitration is to be distinguished from grievance arbitration, which involves the
interpretation or application of the provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
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Detroit experience, opponents of legislatively mandated arbitration
have emphasized the stranglehold effect an arbitrator's award can
have upon city management.6 Nonetheless, even as critics have continued to question the propriety, if not the constitutional validity, 7
a See, e.g., R. CLARK, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION INPUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (Public Employee
Relations Library No. 37, 1972).
Many believe that should current statutes be declared invalid, lawmakers would enact
the requisite constitutional laws if there is sufficient public demand for compulsory arbitration statutes. See, e.g., Anderson, A Survey of Statutes with Compulsory ArbitrationProvisions for Fire and Police, in ARBITRATION OF PoLIcE AND FIREFIGHTER DIsPUTES: PROCEFnINrS
OF A CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION oFNEw CONTRACT TERMS FOR THE PROTECTIVE SERVICES 8-9
(Am. Arb. Ass'n 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROTECTIvE SERvIcES]. See also Grodin, Political
Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 678, 683 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Grodin]. Nevertheless, legal action challenging the constitutionality of compulsory
arbitration statutes has had great appeal, particularly to municipalities attempting to prevent implementation of an unfavorable arbitral award, Bowers, LegislatedArbitration:Legality, Enforceability, and Face-Saving,3 PUB. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 270, 274 & n.25 (1974),
or the submission of an issue to arbitration, see, e.g., City of Everett v. Fire Fighters Local
350, 87 Wash. 2d 572, 555 P.2d 418 (1976) (en banc). Labor unions, on the other hand, usually
view compulsory arbitration as a benefit given in lieu of the right to strike. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1976, § 1, at 90, col. 3, wherein New York police and firefighter union officials
cautioned state authorities concerning the possibility of labor strikes if the compulsory arbitration process were to be abandoned. Since noncompliance with compulsory arbitration
awards might encourage a legislature to abandon the schema, unions generally have acquiesced in the system. See Loewenberg, The Effect of Compulsory Arbitrationon Collective
Negotiation, 1 J. CoLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 177, 185 (1972), reprintedin TRENDS
IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 132, 136 (1975); H. WELLINGTON & R. WmNTER, THE UNION
AND THE CrES 179 (1971); Stern, Final Offer Arbitration-InitialExperience in Wisconsin,
MONTHLY LAB. REv. Sept. 1974 at 39, 41.

The highest courts of numerous jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of their
respective state compulsory arbitration statutes. See City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers
Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973) (equally divided court); Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arb., 352 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1976); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of
Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975) (equally divided court); School Dist. of
Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); City of Amsterdam
v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa.
183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109,
256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553 P.2d
1316 (1976) (en banc); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295
(Wyo. 1968). In Iowa, the Attorney General recently concluded that the state's compulsory
arbitration statute was constitutional on the basis of its similarity to the New York, Michigan, and Maine models. GOv'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 630, at B-1 to B-3 (Nov. 3, 1975).
Some courts, however, have held enabling statutes to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., City
of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975) (constitutional
provision prohibits legislative interference with municipal functions). The principal constitutional objection has focused upon alleged violation of the nondelegation doctrine. See note
15 and accompanying text infra. In addition, several other ingenious but unsuccessful constitutional attacks have been directed at the compulsory arbitration process. For example, in
Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969), the appellant city claimed that the one
man, one vote principle was violated by the statutory scheme because the parties themselves
had chosen the members of the compulsory arbitration panel, thus denying the citizenry
equal participation in a body that determined the distribution of public funds. Id. at 190-91,
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of statutes granting private persons' the power to make contracts
which often dictate future governmental policy, the past decade has
witnessed an unprecedented increase in the implementation and use
of compulsory arbitration.9
255 A.2d at 563-64. The court, however, rejected this theory, stating that the doctrine did
not apply to nonlegislative officers such as arbitrators. Id. Another argument raised by the
Harney appellant was that the city was denied due process by the statutory procedure because state laws prohibited it from raising the tax mill to pay the arbitral award. The court
rejected this claim also, stating that the law did not necessarily restrict the city from raising
taxes. Id. at 190, 255 A.2d at 564-65. For a discussion of other challenges to compulsory
arbitration, see note 12 infra.
Specific provisions of several state constitutions have led some critics to question the
validity of state legislative infringement upon home-rule power through the enactment of
compulsory arbitration statutes. The courts, however, usually have found countervailing
provisions which retain for the legislature the power to resolve labor disputes. See, e.g.,
Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 245-46, 231 N.W.2d 226,
229-30 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 26, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293, 371
N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (1975); City of Everett v. Fire Fighters Local 350, 87 Wash. 2d 572, 555
P.2d 418 (1976) (en banc).
Finally, various courts have summarily rejected the argument that a compulsory arbitration act relinquishes to the arbitration panel a municipality's power to tax. Although an
award might indirectly necessitate an increase in taxes, the courts stress that expenditure
cuts are available as an alternative to raising the tax millage. As a result, there is no violation
of the constitutional prohibition against municipal relinquishment of the power to tax. E.g.,
Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 245-46, 231 N.W.2d 226,
229-30 (1975).
8 Most compulsory arbitration statutes provide for three-member panels, with one member selected by each of the parties and the third selected either by mutual agreement of the
partisan members or by an official stipulated in the enabling statute. McAvoy, Binding
Arbitrationof Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public
Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1192, 1197 & n.28 (1972). One of the problems with this procedure
is that since the panel must arrive at a majority decision, the neutral arbitrator often must
compromise to persuade one of the partisan arbitrators to agree with him. AmERICAN ARBrrATION ASSOCIATION, LABOR ARBITRATION-PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 21 (1973). Still, the deciding vote usually remains with the impartial arbitrator, who is generally a private individual. See Barr, The Public ArbitrationPanel as an Administrative Agency: Can Compulsory
Interest Arbitration be an Acceptable Dispute Resolution Method in the Public Sector?, 39
ALB. L. REv. 377, 386-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Barr].
' The "golden age" of public employee labor relations has heralded two critical developments in municipal labor law. First, in an effort to afford public sector employees the same
statutory "benefits" enjoyed by those in the private sector, many states have granted collective bargaining rights to public employees. See A. Anderson, The Bargaining Table and City
Hall, Address at the Int'l Conference on Trends in Industrial and Labor Relations, Montreal,
Canada (May 27, 1976) (37 states grant collective bargaining rights to at least some public
employees at the end of 1975). See generally LABOR R ATIONS, supra note 2. Second, as a
means of settling contract disputes between governmental bodies and key public employees,
a number of states have enacted statutes providing for compulsory interest arbitration.
In essence, compulsory arbitration represents the quid pro quo for denying the public
employee the right to strike. Although some states now grant public employees a limited right
to strike, see N.J. REPORT, supra note 5, at 18-19 & n.3, compulsory arbitration remains the
preferred procedure for dispute settlement in "strategic" areas of employment. Id. at 20.
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Although compulsory arbitration is emerging from its infancy
with much acclaim for its efficacy in achieving the goals first sought
by its proponents, certain problems remain. Foremost among these
is a need for the institution of effective procedural checks to protect
both the general public and the participating parties from an improvident judgment rendered by a compulsory arbitration panel. As
a result of efforts to achieve this end, the evolution of mandatory
arbitration has diverged noticeably from its consensual counterpart.
Whereas the voluntary arbitration panel's decision has been accorded near absolute finality by both judicial' and statutory" prescription, an award derived from compulsory arbitration may face
several impediments to finality, including, most importantly, judiIndeed, although an increasing number of states are instituting this procedure for other
state or municipal employees, the greater part of compulsory arbitration legislation has been
limited to employees with the most immediate effect on the public health and welfare, viz,
police and firemien. See ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (mandatory compulsory arbitration
for police, firefighters, and correctional employees - sanitation, school, and public utility
employees must submit if the public health is imperiled); CONN. GEN. STAT. § § 7-472, -473c,
-474 (1977) (municipal employees); IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.20 (West Supp. 1976) (all public
employees); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-890 (West Supp. 1976) (municipal transit employees);
ME.REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(4) (Supp. 1977) (municipal employees and teachers); id. § 979D(4) (1974) (state employees); Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, § 4, 1973 Mass. Acts 1135,
reprintedin MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 9 app., at 320 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976) (police
and firefighters); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (Supp. 1977) (police and firefighters); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.69(3) (West Supp. 1976) (all public employees); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 48-801 to -838 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1976) (state employees) (Court of Industrial
Relations); NEV. REv. STAT. § 288.200 (1975) (local government employees); N.Y. Civ. SERV.
LAw § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (police and firefighters); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§
548.1, 548.8-.9 (West Supp. 1977) (police, firefighers and municipal employees); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 243.736, 243.742 (1976) (police, firefighters and guards in correctional facilities and
mental hospitals); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.4-.7 (Purdon Supp. 1977) (police and firefighters); id. § 1101.805 (correctional guards and court employees); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-9.1-1
to .5-13 (1968 & Supp. 1976) (firefighters, police, schoolteachers, and municipal employees);
id. § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1976) (state employees); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20a-8 (Supp. 1975)
(firefighters); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.450 (1974) (uniformed personnel); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
111.77 (West 1974 & Supp. 1977) (police and firefighters); Wyo. STAT. § 27-269 (1967) (firefighters).
10 In a series of 1960 cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, composed of United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the Supreme Court established a firm policy of judicial deference
to the determination of a voluntary arbitration tribunal.
11See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-418 to -419 (1975), quoted in note 65 infra. One
authority has suggested that since an award rendered by a consensual arbitration panel is
subject to review only upon "narrow and improbable grounds," the neutral arbitrators in
consensual commercial arbitration "have a power second only to. . .the Supreme Court."
O'Rourke, An Analysis of Arbitration, 3 B. BuLL. 111 (1966). Although there have been
suggestions that review be broadened in the area of voluntary arbitration, most consensual
arbitration statutes allow an arbitrament to be vacated or modified only on grounds of fraud,
misconduct, or partiality of the arbitrator. See id. at 117-18.
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cial review.12 Since states differ markedly in the scope of judicial
review permitted, an examination of the procedures employed by
the various jurisdictions is both necessary and long overdue. It is the
purpose of this Note to inquire into the present role of judicial
review in public sector compulsory arbitration in the seVeral states,
with particular emphasis on New York, a state in which significant
judicial energy has been expended in the resolution of this issue.
Through this examination, it is hoped that existing problems in this
area will be brought to the forefront of legal discussion.
SCOPE OF

REVIEW:

THE INITIAL STEP

In the realm of compulsory arbitration, whether judicial review
is available, and, if so, to whom, are questions normally answered
and limited by the particular enabling statute. It is only in certain
limited instances, as when a personal right is involved, that judicial
review is constitutionally mandated. 13 Ultimately, it appears that a
2 In the past, the foremost obstacle to finality of compulsory arbitration awards has been
the various constitutional challenges raised by disgruntled participants. See note 7 supra. A
second impediment to arbitral finality exists where a statutory scheme requires legislative or
municipal approval of a compulsory arbitration award prior to its implementation. See, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.9 (West Supp. 1977). Under New York state law, for example,
any arbitral order that requires the amendment or enactment of a law does not become final
until the appropriate legislative body so acts. N.Y. Cirv. SERV. LAW § 204-a(1) (McKinney
1973). In New York City, where the state compulsory arbitration statute does not apply, an
arbitral decision is binding unless an appeal is directed to the Board of Collective Bargaining
which then makes a final determination. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADmIN. CODE ch. 54, § 11737.0(e)(4) (1975 & Supp. 1976). A recent proposal recommended that the City Council of New
York City be empowered to make any final determination concerning binding arbitration

awards which are not satisfactory to both arbitral parties. OFFICE OF LAoR RELATIONS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE N.Y.C. CoLLEcTnvE BARGAINING LAW § 1 (1976). Similarly, recommendations for reform of New York State's compulsory arbitration law, which expires July
1, 1977, urge that political accountability be returned to the political units involved by
furnishing them with final review powers of arbitral awards. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1976, §
1, at 90, col. 3. It should be noted, however, that statutory clauses requiring legislative
approval of a compulsory arbitration award are extremely few in number. The obvious objection to such provisions is that the arbitrators' decision is denied the finality that is normally
associated with the arbitration process. Nonetheless, since many municipalities continue to
resort to the courtroom to contest arbitral awards, new statutory procedures may yet be
enacted which would restore final determination of compulsory arbitral awards to elected
officials.
An interesting question arises in those states where there is no provision similar to the
one in New York State requiring legislative enactment: Will a compulsory arbitration tribunal's decision be binding on the lawmaking body? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
suggested that the Pennsylvania enabling statute impliedly authorizes court approved tax
millage increases to fund awards which the public employer could not otherwise satisfy.
Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 193, 255 A.2d 560, 565 (1969) (dictum). See Holden, Final-Offer
Arbitration in Massaschusetts: One Year Later, 31 ARB. J. 26, 35 (1976).
13 See, e.g., Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944). See also F. COOPER, 2 STATE
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court's determination of the applicable scope of review is contingent
upon its assessment of the nature of the compulsory arbitration
process. At issue is whether the compulsory arbitration schema is
equivalent to either legislative, administrative, or judicial action
and thereby requires a corresponding form of review, or whether it
is a unique function which demands a novel form of review.
Heretofore, litigation contesting compulsory arbitration awards
focused primarily upon the constitutionality of the particular enabling statute. 4 The crucial question in these cases has been whether
the legislature wrongfully delegated its powers. 15 As long as the
ADmINmsTRAnrVE LAw 672-83 (1965)
LAW TREATISE §§ 28.01 -.21 (1958)
"

[hereinafter cited as COOPER]; K. DAVIS, 4
[hereinafter cited as DAvs].

ADMINISTRATIVE

See note 7 supra.

, The basic premise underlying the nondelegation doctrine is that as a result of the
requirements of separation of powers and political accountability, the legislature may not
delegate its powers away. The doctrine's validity, however, is not above question. One commentator has termed the tenet an "unusually murky area of constitutional law." Grodin,
supra note 7, at 683. Another has called it an anachronism. Horton, Arbitration, Arbitrators
and the PublicInterest, 28 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 497, 500 (1975). Nevertheless, the opinions
of state courts are still replete with exhaustive deliberations sustaining the principle. 1 DAVIS,
supra note 13, § 2.02, at 78. Practical necessity dictates that the legislature delegate some of
its powers to others. Whether the judiciary will intervene to oppose a particular delegation is
determined by the courts' "pragmatic analysis" of the consequences of a particular delegation. Should the court find the results sufficiently undesirable, it will strike down the delegation as unconstitutional. See Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich.
229, 246-47, 231 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1975).
In Dearborn,although the constitutionality of the arbitration statute was upheld on the
particular facts of the case, a plurality of the court indicated that the delegation of power to
a neutral arbitrator, a private person with no accountability to the public, was unconstitutional. Justice Levin wrote:
It is the unique method of appointment. . . without accountability to a governmental appointing authority, and the unique dispersal of decision-making power
among numerous ad hoc decision makers, only temporarily in office, precluding
assessment of responsibility for the consequences of their decisions on the level of
public services, the allocation of public resources and the cost of government, which
renders invalid this particular delegation of legislative power.
Id. at 269, 231 N.W.2d at 241 (Levin, J.) (footnote omitted). Casting the pivotal vote which
created an equally divided court and thereby affirmed the lower court's decision to uphold
the statute, however, Justice Williams expressed the opinion that in this instance the delegation was constitutional because the Chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), a publicly appointed official, had selected the neutral arbitrator. Id. at 291,
231 N.W.2d at 252 (Williams, J.). Such an appointment normally occurs when one of the
parties fails to choose an arbitrator for the panel. Consequently, according to Justice Williams
the constitutionality of the delegation hinges on a party's refusal to cooperate within the
system. See id. at 260-61, 231 N.W.2d at 237.
Confronted with a similar delegation of power challenge, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island resolved it with the novel assertion that the arbitrator becomes a public official when
selected. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 116-17, 256 A.2d
206, 210-11 (1969). See also City of Providence v. Local 799, I.A.F.F., 111 R.I. 586, 305 A.2d
93 (1973). In contrast, Pennsylvania's electorate was required to approve a constitutional
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courts have been able to ascertain sufficient standards within the
statute" to guide the arbitration panel in its determination, they
have generally sustained compulsory arbitration legislation in the
17
face of constitutional attack.
amendment, see PA. CONST. art. 3, § 31, in order to circumvent the nondelegation prohibition
which had rendered that state's compulsory arbitration legislation nugatory in a decision by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Erie Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner, 406 Pa. 395,
178 A.2d 691 (1962) (per curiam); J. STERN, C. REHMUS, J. LOEWENBERG, H. KASPER, & B.
DENNIS, FNAL-OFFER ARBITRATION: THE EFFECTS ON PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE BARGAINING 6

(1975) [hereinafter cited as FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION]. Subsequently, an amended compulsory arbitration statute was upheld. Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 188, 255 A.2d 560 (1969).
Interestingly, courts in Wyoming and South Dakota, interpreting compulsory arbitration
provisions based upon constitutions similar to the earlier version of the Pennsylvania constitution, arrived at conflicting decisions. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968) (statute did not unconstitutionally delegate municipal function); City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975)
(unconstitutional legislative interference with municipal function). For an extensive discussion of the nondelegation doctrine, see 1 DAVIS, supra note 13, §§ 2.01 -.16.
"1 The standards enumerated in a compulsory arbitration statute are often crucial to the
formulation of a scope of review. They are the indicia by which the legislature controls the
power it has delegated. Not only do detailed standards direct the arbitrators to consider
specific criteria in making the award, but they also serve as a guide for the parties as to the
issues upon which they must focus, thereby shielding the arbitrator from an inundation of
irrelevant material. PROTECTIVE SERVICES, supra note 7, at 11.
While most state compulsory arbitration statutes contain a number of legislative criteria,
some courts have inferred the existence of such standards even if they have not been expressly
included. See Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated that since the great advantage of arbitration is its flexibility, rigid
statutory guidelines "would be sheer folly." Id. at 189, 255 A.2d at 563.
An important statutory criterion which has gained significance recently is the employer's
"ability to pay." See generally Mulcahy, Ability to Pay: The Public Employee Dilemma, 31
ARB. J. 90 (1976). Whereas some statutes expressly contain this standard, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.239(c) (Supp. 1977), arbitrators have customarily considered this factor even
without statutory stipulation. See, e.g., IMPARTIAL MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NEW YORK CITY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW RECOMMENDED BY THE OFFICE OF LABOR RELATIONS TO THE CITY

ADMINISTRATION FOR ENACTMENT BY THE CITY COUNCIL 11-12 (1976). For an example of the
standards contained in a typical compulsory arbitration statute, see text accompanying note
20 infra.
A recent statistical research analysis reveals that the factors most commonly considered
by arbitrators include prevailing trends in the particular industry, ability to pay, and cost of
living and conditions in comparable jobs. Stephens, Resolution of Impasses in Public Employee Bargaining,MONTHLY LAB. REv. Jan. 1976 at 57.
11 Constitutional challenges to compulsory arbitration based upon due process have not
received extensive consideration from the judiciary. The earliest litigation testing a state
compulsory arbitration statute on due process grounds was Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). Involved in WolffPacking was an experimental Kansas
statute which created a Court of Industrial Relations and gave that body wide powers of
compulsory arbitration over all labor disputes in certain industries. Kansas Industrial Court
Act, ch. 29, 1920 Kan. Sess. Laws 35 (repealed 1925). The Supreme Court held that mandatory arbitration constitutes a taking of property and was justified only in industries
sufficiently affected with the public interest. As a consequence, the Court declared unconsti-
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The first case to deal directly with the scope of review of compulsory arbitration was New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. Communications Workers of America," a 1950 decision by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. In New Jersey Bell the telephone company
challenged an award granting its employees a salary increase and
various benefits. The applicable public utility compulsory arbitration statute" stipulated that the arbitration tribunal base its findings and decision upon certain specified factors, including the interests and welfare of the public, the wages, hours and conditions of
employment of employees doing comparable work, and all factors
normally considered during voluntary collective bargaining. 0 Rejecting the phone company's contention that the statute was unconstitutional because the standards enumerated were "vague, illusory,
insufficient and arbitrary,"'" the New Jersey Supreme Court sustained the law despite the generality of the statutory criteria.2
Although the statute itself was sustained, the court ordered the
case remanded to the board of arbitration, finding that the award
"contravened the orderly process contemplated by the statute to
insure substantial justice. ' 23 The most important factor militating
against enforcement of the award was that the arbitrators had failed
to consider all of the delineated standards.24 Significantly, the court
tutional that part of the statute which provided for the fixing of wages via compulsory
arbitration in the meat packing industry. 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923). In subsequent litigation
involving the same parties, Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267 U.S. 552
(1925), the Court made it clear that included within this ban was the regulation of hours. Id.
at 569. Subsequently, the Kansas act was repealed. Ch. 258, § 10, 1925 Kan. Sess. Laws 335.
The Supreme Court has also held the establishment through compulsory arbitration of wage
regulations in the coal mining industry to be impermissible. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286
(1924).
A later Supreme Court decision, Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), significantly weakened the due process argument against the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration statutes. The Lincoln Court held that states have the
"power to legislate against. . . injurious practices in their internal commercial and business
affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition
or of some valid federal law." Id. at 536.
" 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950).
" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13B-1 to -27 (1965). This statute was one of several similar acts
intended to prevent labor strikes following World War I. See Katz, Two Decades of State
Labor Legislation: 1937-1957, 8 LAB. L.J. 747, 755 (1957).
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13B-27(b) (1965).
22 5 N.J. at 370, 75 A.2d at 729.
2 Id.

z Id. at 380, 75 A.2d at 734.
24 The court concluded that the arbitration panel had based its decision entirely on
industry "trends," which was only one of the five stipulated statutory standards. Referring
to a case where the Supreme Court refused to uphold an Interstate Commerce Commission
rate adjustment because the agency failed to consider all the statutory criteria, the New
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also indicated that the judicial review provided by the statute2
entailed the application of a substantial evidence standard. 6
Following this initial foray into the realm of judicial review, the
issue remained dormant for the next two decades. During the 1950's,
state public utility compulsory arbitration statutes were held to be
preempted by federal legislation,2 and public employee unions generally had not yet gained the strength that they would develop
during the next decade. 8 The decline in the utilization of compulsory arbitration, with the corresponding reduction in litigation, resulted in few opportunities for the judiciary to develop a form of
judicial review suited to compulsory arbitration. In the 1970's, however, as a result of a new confidence in the compulsory arbitration
process, the evolution of an appropriate scope of judicial review has
proceeded apace.
Mount St. Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood: THE

SEMINAL OPINION

In recent years, the New York Court of Appeals has been the
only state court of last resort which has given detailed consideration
to the "constitutionally required breadth of review" of compulsory
arbitration awards. The court squarely confronted the issue with
respect to private sector compulsory arbitration in Mount St.
Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood,21 a decision involving the scope of
30
judicial review under section 716 of the New York Labor Law.
Jersey Bell court held that it was necessary to apply all the standards which were applicable.
Id. at 373-74, 75 A.2d at 730-31, citing Brimstone R.R. & Canal Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 104 (1928).
" Discussing the scope of judicial review applied by the court, one commentator noted:
"It is thus apparent that the Court insisted on Judicial control over procedure before the
Board which goes far beyond the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitration awards rendered pursuant to voluntary arbitration agreements." GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION
RELATING TO PUBLIC UTILrTY LABOR DISPUTES, REPORT TO GOVERNOR ROBERT B. MEYNER (1954),

quoted in M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SMn'LEMENT 679 (1968).
21 5 N.J. at 354, 75 A.2d at 733. For a definition of the substantial evidence test, see note
44 infra.
27 The import of public utility compulsory arbitration statutes was fatally weakened in
1951 when the Supreme Court declared the Wisconsin statute to be an unconstitutional
interference with federal regulation under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372,
49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), and the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.). Association of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, Div. 998 v. Association of
Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 399 (1951).
2' See generally Rehmus, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, in LABOR RELATIONS,
supra note 2, at 7-9.
26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970).
3' N.Y. LABOR LAw § 716 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
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Modeled after Minnesota's charitable hospital act,3" the New York
statute provides for compulsory arbitration of disputes in labor contract negotiations between employees of private voluntary or nonprofit hospitals and bargaining representativies of such facilities.
Section 716 specifically incorporates the provisions of article 75 of
the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR),32 which delineates the scope of review of consensual arbitration, limiting it to
matters pertaining to the purity of the arbitral process, such as the
arbitrator's partiality, fraud, or acts in excess of power. 3
In Mount St. Mary's, the appellant hospital sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the compulsory arbitration provisions of
the statute, urging that review pursuant to article 75 failed to provide due process of law under federal and state constitutional mandates. Acknowledging the differences between voluntary and compulsory arbitration, 4 the court of appeals declared that a literal
31 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.35 (1966). The Minnesota statute, along with § 716 of New
York's Labor Law, was presumably preempted by federal legislation in 1974 when Congress
expanded the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act to include charitable hospitals.
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. V 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
32

N.Y. Civ PRAC. LAw § § 7501-14 (McKinney 1974).
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 7511(b)(1) (McKinney 1963) provides:

The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either participated in the arbitration or was served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if the
court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(i) corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where
the award was by confession; or
(iii) an arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded
his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or
(iv) failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the party
applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice
of the defect and without objection.
Pursuant to § 7511(c) a court shall modify an award if:
1. there was a miscalculation of figures or a mistake in the description of any
person, thing or property referred to in the award; or
2. the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the
award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues
submitted; or
3. the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
Id. § 7511(c). This review provision is identical in substance to those found in most general
arbitration statutes. Compare id. § 7511, with CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-418 to -419 (1975),
quoted in note 65 infra.
3' 26 N.Y.2d at 500, 260 N.E.2d at 511, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 867. The court stated:
At the inception it should be observed that the essence of arbitration, as traditionally used and understood, is that it be voluntary and on consent. The introduction
of compulsion to submit to this informal tribunal is to change its essence. . . . The
simple and ineradicable fact is that voluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitra-

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:604

application of the review furnished in article 75 would be constitutionally inadequate. The court noted that since parties may legally
agree to almost anything save rare matters contrary to public policy,
only the most limited review" of voluntary arbitration is allowed
pursuant to article 75.35 As this restricted review does not permit
judicial investigation into issues of law or fact,3" the court characterized it as essentially an inquiry into the arbitrator's good faith." In
a compulsory arbitration situation, however, the Mount St. Mary's
court found that the dictates of due process require that the arbitration panel's award be supported by the evidence. Emphasizing
that the tribunal's power is conferred by statute, the court declared
that it would be incongruous to allow the panel to exercise power
greater than that which "the Constitution permits the Legislature
to delegate [by statute] to an administrative or regulatory
agency.""3 Since delegated authority generally must, at a minimum,
be supported by reasonable or rational legislative standards reviewable in a court of law,4" the court determined that a compulsory
arbitration statute must also contain sufficient statutory standards
to pass constitutional scrutiny. To facilitate judicial review of the
compulsory arbitration panel's compliance with these standards,
the court maintained that a scope of review broader than that pro41
vided in article 75 must be formulated.
tion are fundamentally different if only because one may, under our system, consent
to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of right, but similar restrictions or
deprivations, if compelled by government, must accord with procedural and substantive due process.
Id.

, 26 N.Y.2d at 507, 260 N.E.2d at 516, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 873-74.
3 See 8 J: WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, Nsw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
26 N.Y.2d at 507, 260 N.E.2d at 515, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
Id. at 508, 260 N.E.2d at 516-17, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
3'Id., 260 N.E.2d at 516, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 874.

7511.11 (1975).

o See id.

See id. at 508-09, 260 N.E.2d at 516-17, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 874-75. The leading case
mandating broad judicial review when property rights are confiscated is Ohio Valley Water
Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920). In that case, the Supreme Court held that a
court must exercise de novo review of administrative determinations resulting in a confiscation of property. The viability of this doctrine has been a matter of great controversy and its
application today is rare. See 4 DAVis, supra note 13, § 29.09; 2 COOPER, supra note 13, at
672-76. In New York, the Ben Avon rule was adopted in Staten Island Edison Corp. v.
Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947). See also Benjamin, JudicialReview of Administrative Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals, 48 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 19-36 (1948). De novo review, however, has largely been replaced by the
"substantial evidence" scope of review. See Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26
N.Y.2d 493, 504-05, 260 N.E.2d 508, 513-14, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 870-71 (1970). For a definition
of the substantial evidence test, see note 44 infra. The Mount St. Mary's court indicated that
if de novo review were applied, the compulsory arbitration process would be inoperable
"
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Attempting to define the appropriate scope of review, the
Mount St. Mary's court held that where the compulsory arbitration
award is made pursuant to a dispute involving negotiations for a
new contract, i.e., interest arbitration, a reviewing court must ascertain whether the arbitration panel acted in an "arbitrary or capricious"4 manner. If a reasonable basis for the award is found, "the
court's power to review. . . ceases." 4 In contrast, where arbitration
is utilized to settle a dispute involving an existing collective bargaining agreement, i.e., grievance arbitration, a court must determine whether the award was supported by substantial evidence."
because of "delays, the proliferation of litigation procedure, and [added expenses] . .. ."
Id. at 509, 260 N.E.2d at 519, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 875; cf. Christensen, The Disguised Review of
the Merits of ArbitrationAwards, in LABOR ARBITRATION AT QUARTER CENTURY MARK: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 99, 113
(1973) (extensive judicial review threatens voluntary arbitration). The concurring opinion in
Mount St. Mary's expressed concern lest even the limited review outlined by the majority in
its expansion of article 75 have such an effect. See 26 N.Y.2d at 511-20, 260 N.E.2d at 51824, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 877-85 (Fuld, C.J., concurring). Suggesting that delays in the arbitration
process might lead to "strikes and picket lines," Judge Fuld urged that the technical complexity of formulating a labor contract be left to the expertise of the arbitrator. Id. at 519-20,
260 N.E.2d at 523-24, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
Whether the arbitrators, as private individuals, have the resources or the ability necessary for effective broad budget planning has been questioned by various authorities. See, e.g.,
Horton, Arbitration,Arbitrators and the Public Interest, 28 INDUS. LAB. REL. REv. 497, 501
(1975); Primeaux & Brannen, Why Few Arbitratorsare Deemed Acceptable, MONTHLY LAB.
REV. Sept. 1975 at 27. The problem is illustrated by an article which urges arbitrators to
consider thirteen detailed factors in assessing the "ability to pay" standard alone. Mulcahy,
Ability to Pay: The Public Employee Dilemma, 31 ARB. J. 90 (1976).
2 See 26 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 260 N.E.2d at 517, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. Arbitrary or
capricious action has been described as "willful and unreasoning action without consideration
of or in disregard of the facts or without determining principle. A determination made by an
administrative agency absent a factual rationale in the record is [also] 'arbitrary and
capricious.'" Elwood Investors Co. v. Behme, 79 Misc. 2d 910, 913, 361 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1974) (citations omitted). See also Fink v. Cole, 1 N.Y.2d 48, 53,
133 N.E.2d 691, 694, 150 N.Y.S.2d 175, 179 (1956). It has been said that "[w]here there is
room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary and capricious [if] exercised honestly and upon
due consideration though it may be felt that a different conclusion might have been reached."
Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 526, 495 P.2d 1358, 1363 (1972).
" 26 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 260 N.E.2d at 517, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
" Id.
To satisfy the substantial evidence test, a finding must be supported by evidence
which is "so substantial that from it an inference of the existence of the fact found may be
drawn reasonably. A mere scintilla of evidence sufficient to justify a suspicion is not sufficient
to support a finding upon which legal rights and obligations are based." Stork Restaurant,
Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 273-74, 26 N.E.2d 247, 255 (1940). It is important to note that
the substantial evidence standard of review is a narrow one. The Supreme Court of Michigan
has stated that it has yet to hear a case where a compulsory arbitration award was vacated
or modified because it was not supported by substantial evidence. Dearborn Fire Fighters
Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 267-68 & n.53, 231 N.W.2d 226, 240, 241 & n.53
(1975). One commentator has stated that this scope of review will ensure that an arbitral
award escapes judicial intermeddling. See Anderson, Compulsory Arbitration Under State
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In either situation, however, according to the court, the fundamental inquiry is whether the decision of the compulsory arbitration
panel had a rational basis. 5
The dissimilar methods of review adopted by the Mount St.
Mary's court is indicative of its belief that the nature of compulsory
grievance arbitration differs from that of compulsory interest arbitration. Since the former process essentially involves interpretation
of contract terms and is thus adjudicatory in nature, the court
deemed the activities of the compulsory arbitration panel to be
quasi-judicial. In contrast, the court viewed interest arbitration,
whereby new contract terms and conditions are formulated by the
compulsory arbitration tribunal, as quasi-legislative.17 The Mount
Statutes, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 259 (1969). For a discussion of the problems associated with the substantial evidence
rule, see Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945
(1958). See generally 4 DAVIS, supra note 13, § 29.02.
11See 26 N.Y.2d at 510, 260 N.E.2d at 517, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 876. One may question
whether there is any real distinction between the arbitrary and capricious test and the substantial evidence test. In fact, in Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 313 N.E.2d 321,
325, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974) (citation omitted), the court of appeals concluded that
"[rnationality is what is reviewed under both the substantial evidence rule and the arbitrary
and capricious standard." Nevertheless, in 125 Bar Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 24 N.Y.2d
174, 178-79, 247 N.E.2d 157, 159, 299 N.Y.S.2d 194, 198 (1969), the court, although noting
that the two tests are virtually identical, did distinguish them by stating that the substantial
evidence test requires "competent common-law evidence."
1126 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 260 N.E.2d at 517, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. In administrative law,
quasi-judicial determinations are characterized as either determinations of fact, determinations of law, or determinations in the exercise of discretion, and the three are subject to
different forms of judicial review. 1 R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 326-27 (1942) [hereinafter cited as BENJAMIN]. Generally, quasi-judicial determinations of law are fully reviewable by a court; exercises of discretion are reviewable only
to protect against arbitrary or capricious action; and quasi-judicial findings of fact are subject
to the substantial evidence rule. Id. at 327-28.
The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that the essential elements of compulsory
arbitration, i.e., a hearing, introduction of evidence, standards to guide the arbitrators, formal findings of fact, a written opinion, and judicial review, are all indicative of an exercise
of quasi-judicial power. Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229,
264, 231 N.W.2d 226, 239 (1975). Other courts have also taken this position, noting that
determinations which involve property rights are judicial in nature. Caso v. Coffey, 83 Misc.
2d 614, 372 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975). See also 8 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN,
& A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 7803.12, at 78-84 (1976).
11 26 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 260 N.E.2d at 517, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. An early Supreme
Court case distinguished legislative from judicial actions as follows:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose
and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing
conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). Compulsory arbitration is
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St. Mary's court apparently considered the compulsory arbitration
panel to be tantamount to an administrative agency, which similarly engages in both quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative activities."
Thus, the scope of review chosen by the court for the different functions of the compulsory arbitration process parallels the scope of
review applicable to an administrative agency.4 9

analogous to legislative action in that it affects the allocation of public resources, the level of
public services provided to the community as a whole, and the cost of government. Dearborn
Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 262-63, 231 N.W.2d 226, 238
(1975). As one commentator has noted, compulsory arbitration is not merely an adjudication
between right and wrong, but, more importantly, it is a balancing of priorities and an accommodation of varying interests. PRoTEcrIvE SERVICES, supra note 7, at 6-7. One arbitrator,
remarking that an arbitrator is often the only person in the arbitration process who represents
the public interest, has urged that the neutral arbitrator not make awards "inimical to the
welfare of the public." Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 658, at B-2 (May 24, 1976) (remarks
of Eric Schmertz). This criterion is often included in the arbitration statute. E.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 423.239 (West Supp. 1977).

11 See 26 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 260 N.E.2d at 516-17, 311 N.Y.2d at 875-76. In order to
determine the proper scope of review, later courts have similarly considered whether a compulsory tribunal should be equated with an administrative agency. In New York, this inquiry
has consistently been resolved in the affirmative. See, e.g., Caso v. Coffey, 83 Misc. 2d 614,
372 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975). It has been suggested that this approach
is appropriate due to
[t]hree essential features distinguishing compulsory arbitration of negotiation disputes in the public sector [from voluntary arbitration]: 1) it is, by law, compulsory; 2) it delegates to neutral "experts" powers previously exercised by a legislative
body; and 3) statutory standards and guidelines circumscribe the decision-making
power of the experts. It is evident that these features describe a governmental
mechanism significantly different from that customarily understood as arbitration.
It is also clear that they define the usual administrative agency.
Barr, supra note 8, at 384 (emphasis added . Most importantly, the fact that the compulsory
arbitration panel's powers of discretion are circumscribed by legislatively prescribed criteria
designed to ensure that the panel engages only in legislative activities, Dearborn Fire Fighters
Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 288, 231 N.W.2d 226, 250 (1975), truly reflects
an administrative process. See Fox, Reviewability of Quasi-LegislativeActs of Public Officials in New York Under Article 78 of the CPLR, 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 49, 72 (1964). The
statutory criteria, however, are not a directive to the panel to follow one particular course of
action when confronted with two reasonable but opposite positions presented by opposing
parties. It is therefore submitted that the compulsory arbitration process is most analogous
to an administrative exercise of discretion as distinguished from a quasi-judicial determination of fact, in that from the latter only one decision can result, whereas the former provides
no such certainty. 1 BENJAMIN, supra note 46, at 344. Significantly, administrative exercises
of discretion may be reviewed only to determine whether the action was arbitrary, capricious,
or not predicated upon the prescribed standards. Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231,
313 N.E.2d 321, 325, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974); People ex rel. N.Y. & Queens Gas Co. v.
McCall, 219 N.Y. 84, 113 N.E. 795 (1916), af'd, 245 U.S. 345 (1917); 1 BENJAMIN, supra note
46, at 344-46.
11See 26 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 260 N.E.2d at 516-17, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76
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THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER MODERN STATUTORY
PROCEDURES

There has been a dearth of judicial inquiry into either the na-

ture of the compulsory arbitration process or the appropriate scope
of judicial review. In many states, the scope of review is delineated
by statutes which either expressly proscribe any review or specifically delineate a particular scope of review. Several states, however,
have statutes which contain no explicit provision concerning appeal
or review.

Review Unspecified
Where a compulsory arbitration statute fails to articulate a
scope of review,50 the courts nevertheless are generally inclined to
find a limited power to review in situations involving alleged "fraud,
lack of impartiality or wrongful assumption of power by the

[arbitration] panel."5 At times an even more extensive authority
to review has been inferred. For example, in City of Warwick v.

Warwick Regular Firemen's Association, 2 the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, while upholding the validity of that state's compulsory arbitration statute for policemen and firemen, noted in dicta
that the standards enumerated in the statute serve
a dual purpose. They not only operate to direct or limit the action
of [the arbitrators], but they are standards pursuant to which on
judicial review a court may determine whether the action taken by
the [arbitrators] was capricious, arbitrary, or in excess of the
3
delegated authority.

In formulating this scope of review, the Rhode Island court was
guided by its determination that the arbitration panel's "power to
fix the salaries of public employees [was] clearly a legislative
function."54 It would seem that in situations where the compulsory
arbitration panel is perceived to be engaged in quasi-judicial activities and the enabling statute is silent as to judicial review, a reviewSee, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.1-.27 (West Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§
548.1-.14 (West Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 28-9.1 to -9.4 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 3420a-8 to -9 (Supp. 1975).
1, McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution
of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1192, 1204 (1972); cf. 2 COOPER, supra
note 13, at 677 (review of administrative determinations).
52 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969).
Id. at 116-17, 256 A.2d at 211.
5, Id. at 116, 256 A.2d at 210 (emphasis added).
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ing court will be predisposed to apply the substantial evidence standard. 5
Review Proscribed
Several states have enacted statutes which explicitly preclude
any appeal from the determination of a compulsory arbitration tribunal." For example, Pennsylvania's act 111 of 1968 provides that
"[t]he determination of the [arbitration] board . . . shall be final
• . . and binding. . . . No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any
court. '57 The Pennsylvania courts, however, have not construed the
statute literally. In City of Washington v. Police Department," the
city sought review of a compulsory arbitration award, claiming that
the Pennsylvania Constitution guaranteed it the right of appeal
from a determination by an administrative agency. 9 Noting that
the Pennsylvania legislature's power to preclude appeals has long
been recognized," the City of Washington court not only rejected
this proposition, but also refused to treat the compulsory arbitration
The distinguishing feature of judicial or quasi-judicial activity is that it affects property right. 8 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KoRN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 7803.12 (1976).
In New York, such action has traditionally been subject to review based upon the substantial
evidence test, which is particularly suited to situations where a hearing has been held and
facts amassed in a record. See id. 7803.09; 1 BENJAMIN, supra note 46, at 329. See also N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7803(4) (McKinney 1963). Similarly, in the compulsory arbitration schema,
courts have applied the substantial evidence test in cases where the arbitral panel's function
is characterized as quasi-judicial. See, e.g., note 110 infra; cf. Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
No. 630, at B-1 (Nov. 3, 1975) (Iowa attorney general views state's compulsory arbitrations
as reviewable under substantial evidence test).
11E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-890(E) (West Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.72(7)
(West Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.7 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
11PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.7(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977). the no review provision is
favored by many unions. See PROTECTrIVE SERVICES, supra note 7, at 94 (speech by John J.
Harrington). The Pennsylvania statute was passed following a successful campaign waged by
Pennsylvania's police and firefighter organizations. See FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION, supra note
15, at 6. Whether there was a strong legislative intention to preclude review, however, was
questioned by one commentator who remarked critically that the "no review" provision may
have passed simply because of the great haste with which the legislation was enacted and
because of the preferences of the police and firefighter unions. Id. at 18. One authority has
noted that statutory provisions for review of administrative determinations "[ulsually...
appear well down at the end of the statutes. Statutes are long and I suspect by the time the
legislators draft them and get down to these provisions, they get rather tired, and they do
not pay much attention to them." Stason, Methods of JudicialRelief from Administrative
Action, 24 A.B.A.J. 274, 276 (1938).
- 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969).
51 The Pennsylvania constitution states in pertinent part: "There shall be a right of
appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a
right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record
or to an appellate court . . . ." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 9.
0 436 Pa. at 172. 259 A.2d at 439-40.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:604

panel as the equivalent of an administrative agency." The court did
conclude, however, that the arbitration panel, as a decision-making
tribunal, must proceed in accordance with due process mandates.
Consequently, it permitted an appeal in the nature of a narrow
certiorari62 limited to "1) the question of jurisdiction; 2) the regularity of the proceedings before the [panel]; 3) questions of excess in
exercise of powers; and 4) constitutional questions."6 3
Scope of Review Specified
A comparison of those statutes which delineate a specific scope
of review reveals a lack of uniformity as to the treatment accorded
this subject by the states. A trend, however, does seem to be emerging, and it appears that both the broadest and narrowest forms of
review eventually will be abandoned in favor of either the limited
review associated with the "arbitrary and capricious" and
"substantial evidence" tests or a judically evolved review concerned
with whether the statutorily prescribed standards have been considered by the compulsory arbitration panel.
Several states provide for review of compulsory arbitration
awards by cross-reference to their voluntary arbitration act.64 In
these states, the traditional limited review associated with consensual arbitration is applied and the role of the courts is to ensure the
arbitrator's integrity. 5 It has been suggested, however, that this
1l436

Pa. at 172, 259 A.2d at 440. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
Professor Cooper has stated that review by petition for writ of certiorari normally is
granted at the discretion of the court and historically has been denied unless the administrative agency's activities were considered judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, 2 COOPER, supra
note 13, at 644-49. The scope of review on certiorari varies from state to state. Id. at 650. A
"narrow" certiorari, as is employed in Pennsylvania, involves consideration only of questions
relating to jurisdiction, whereas a "broad" certiorari involves consideration of the entire
record. Id.
" 436 Pa. at 174, 259 A.2d at 441, citing Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness
Racing Comm'n, 405 Pa. 1, 5-6. 173 A.2d 97, 99 (1961). City of Washington involved an appeal
from a compulsory arbitration panel's award which required the city to pay hospitalization
insurance premiums for the families of its policemen. This was specifically prohibited by
legislation allowing the city to contract for insurance only for its employees. Interpreting the
award as an "excess of power," the court found that the award conflicted with the words "in
accordance with law," 436 Pa. at 175, 259 A.2d Pa. at 175, 259 A.2d, which appear in the
constitutional amendment authorizing compulsory arbitration in Pennsylvania. See PA.
12

CONST.

at 3, § 31.

E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-474(j)(3)(1977).
For example, the Connecticut general arbitration statute provides that an award can
be vacated:
(a) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(b) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators
• ; (c) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
"
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type of review is insufficient in the public sector, and that at least
as to issues of law the arbitration panel's determination should not
be conclusive.6 6 Since the statutory standards are intended to establish strict guidelines for the arbitrators, any transgression of these
standards, as occurs when a law is erroneously interpreted, is beyond the legislative mandate and therefore unlawful. 7
Maine's statute, which otherwise adheres to the traditional limited review, accounts for this possibility by stipulating that a compulsory arbitration award may be reversed if it was predicated upon
an "erroneous ruling or finding of law." 8 In City of Biddeford v.
Biddeford Teachers Association,9 a case challenging the constitutional adequacy of the Maine Municipal Employees Labor Relations Law,7" one justice suggested that under this broadened review
procedure the court might be permitted to conduct an independent
inquiry into questions of law and fact.7 In the course of its decision,
the evenly divided City of Biddeford court considered whether the
compulsory arbitration act contained sufficient standards to validate the delegation of a "clearly legislative" function. Noting that
compelling a party to submit to binding arbitration constitutes
"police power" measure, the court searched the statutory language
for a legislatively prescribed "intelligible principle" or "primary
standard. 7 2 Half the justices concluded that the express statutory
the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy . . . ; (d) if the arbitrators have exceeded their
powers ....
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-418 (1975). An award may be modified or corrected:
(a) If there has been an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in
the award; (b) if the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters
submitted; (c) if the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits
of the controversy.
Id. § 52-419.
11See Grodin, supra note 7, at 698-99.
87Id.
8 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-M(3) (1974).
304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973).
'o ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979 (1974).
304 A.2d at 408, 412 (Wernick, J., concurring and dissenting).
72 Where standards are not specifically defined in the enabling statute, courts sometimes
search for an intelligible principle or primary standard to limit the legislative power delegated to bodies not directly responsible to the electorate. Id. at 400, 403-15. See note 15 supra.
Suggesting a measure of review broader than that statutorily prescribed in Maine, one justice
quoted a dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan which concluded that the use of statutory
standards serves two primary functions:
First,it insures that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made
• . . by the body immediately responsible to the people. Second, it prevents judicial
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purpose of "promot[i ng] the improvement of the relationship between public employers and their employees 7' 3 constituted a sufficient standard to guide the arbitrators. In the eyes of these justices,
a court exercising its power of review must ascertain whether the
arbitration panel applied the statutory standard, thereby assuring
that the panel has not made an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasona74
ble determination.
Other methods of review expressly provided for in the spectrum
of state statutes include the arbitrary or capricious test contained
in Washington's uniformed personnel compulsory arbitration statute,' 5 the substantial evidence test utilized in Michigan7 and Oregon," and de novo review."
Washington's statute, which provides for "review . . .solely
upon the question of whether the decision of the panel was arbitrary
or capricious, 719 has been strictly construed by that state's highest
court. In Local 1296, IAFF v. City of Kennewick," the Supreme
Court of Washington reversed a lower court decision which had
vacated a compulsory arbitration award rendered after contract
negotiations between the city and its firemen had proven unsuccessful. The city contested the award on the basis of facts indicating
that the neutral member of the arbitration panel might not have
been completely impartial. This, the city contended, removed the
"appearance of fairness from the arbitral award." The city's argureview from becoming merely an exercise at large by providing the courts with some
measure against which to judge the official action that has been challenged.
304 A.2d 387, 407 (Wernick, J.), quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963)
(Harlan, Stewart, Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (deletions by Judge Wernick).
13 304 A.2d at 411 (Wernick, Webber, Pomeroy, JJ.). While all the City of Biddeford
justices concurred in the belief that the delegation to an arbitral tribunal was valid, the court
divided three-to-three as to whether there were sufficient standards in the statute to guide
the arbitrators in their decision. As a result, the statute was upheld.
" Id. at 408, 412. Although the other three members of the Biddeford court approved of
the legislative delegation to the arbitrators, id.at 398, they refused to uphold the compulsory
arbitration provisions of the statute. They objected to what they considered to be an absence
of precedural safeguards in the form of specific criteria for the arbitrators to consider. Id. at
402. Moreover, these justices objected to the statutory scope of judicial review, stating not
only that the arbitration panel was not subject to review of its findings of fact, but also that
the panel was not required to make findings of fact. Obviously, this "seriously limits the
ability of the courts on appeal to protect against unbridled discretion." Id. (Weatherbee,
Dufresne, Archibald, JJ.).
" WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.450 (1974).
,' MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.242 (Supp. 1977).
" OR. REv. STAT. § 243.752 (1976).
7' See notes 90-94 and accompanying text infra.
"1WASH. Rv. CODE § 41.56.450 (1974) (emphasis added).
8086 Wash. 2d 156, 542 P.2d 1253 (1975) (en banc).
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ment was based on a doctrine created in Washington zoning cases
which states that "[i]t is important not only that justice be done
but that it also appear to be done.""1 Decisions by "administrative
tribunals acting in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities" lacking the
necessary appearance of fairness are rendered invalid thereby. In
City of Kennewick, the Washington court stressed the importance
of differentiating between this appearance of fairness doctrine and
the arbitrary and capricious rule.12 Although the arbitration procedure in question might have "appeared" unfair, there existed insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that the award itself had
been arbitrary or capricious. In view of the explicit statutory language, the court felt constrained to uphold the arbitrament. 3
The Michigan compulsory arbitration statute for firemen and
police specifically requires that an arbitral award be supported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence based upon the
whole record. 4 In Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of
Dearborn," the Michigan Court of Appeals went beyond this explicit statutory mandate and adopted an expanded standard of review. Agreeing with the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in its City
of Warwick decision,88 the Dearbornbench was of the opinion that
the well-defined standards delineated in the act "not only properly
directed and limited the authority of the arbitrators, but also
formed an adequate basis for judicial review." 87 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the lower court's result in a split
decision. Justice Coleman, in a separate opinion, stated: "Although
not specifically described in the statute, failure to follow the
legislatively-mandated criteria is always available as grounds for
judicial review."
11Buell v. City of Bremerton,

80 Wash. 2d 518, 523, 495 P.2d 1358, 1361 (1972) (en banc).

Since this appearance of fairness doctrine is intended to apply to actions of quasi-judicial
tribunals rather than to legislative or administrative bodies, see id. at 528, 495 P.2d at 1365
(Neill, J., dissenting), a reading of Buell, in juxtaposition with Kennewick and the Washington compulsory arbitration schema, suggests that the highest court of Washington views the
compulsory arbitration panel as essentially performing a quasi-legislative function.
82 542 P.2d at 1256.
83Id.

"

MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 423.242 (Supp. 1977). One commentator, suggesting that

an appeal as of right is almost always afforded by our judicial system, concluded that there
should always be judicial review in compulsory arbitration and characterized the Michigan
provision as "juridically correct," Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public
Sector, 42 U. CN. L. REv. 47, 70 (1973).
1 42 Mich. App. 51, 201 N.W.2d 650 (1972), aff'd by divided court, 394 Mich. 229, 231
N.W.2d 226 (1975).
See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
'T 42 Mich. App. at 56, 201 N.W.2d at 652.
394 Mich. at 297-98, 231 N.W.2d at 255 (Coleman, J.).
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Oregon's compulsory arbitration statute, which also stipulates

that the award be supported by substantial evidence, specifically
adds the qualification that the award be "based upon the factors"
enumerated in the statute." A reading of the Oregon statute together with the Maine court's opinion in City of Biddeford, suggests
that the courts may well favor a decidely narrow scope of review,
one. limited to determining whether the arbitration panel considered
and applied the statutory standards. Such review would assure compliance with the legislative intent, while maintaining a minimum
of judicial interference with the compulsory arbitration process.
An alternative mode of statutory review, de novo review, has
been rejected by the courts."0 When exercising this type of review, a
court conducts an independent inquiry into the circumstances of the
case. It is permitted to substitute its own judgment as to the law
and the facts without regard to the arbitral record.9 1 In the context
of compulsory arbitration, de novo review would, in effect, allow a
reviewing court to make a legislative determination based upon a
preponderance of the evidence standard.2 Critical questions concerning the separation of powers doctrine are presented by such a
procedure. 3 This problem, however, has been rendered somewhat
moot, for the only state statute to provide for de novo review of
compulsory arbitration awards is no longer effective.
" OR. REV. STAT. § 243.752 (1976).

" See Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 504-05, 260 N.E.2d 508,
513-14, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 870-71 (1970).
" See United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963).
See Smyser, PublicEmployees and PublicEmployees Unions: Their Rights and Limitations in South Dakota, 17 S.D.L. REv. 65, 78-79 (1972).
13See 2 COOPER, supra note 13, at 679-80.
'1 In City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975),
the court found one section of South Dakota's compulsory arbitration statute, ch. 70, §§ 115, 1971 S.D. Sess. Laws 72, to be invalid. Determining that the invalid section was not
severable, the court ruled the statute unconstitutional in its entirety. As a consequence, the
section calling for de novo review of appeals from compulsory arbitrations, id. § 12, was also
invalidated.
Several states have enacted compulsory arbitration statutes with de novo review procedures to settle certain types of civil suits, such as small claims. For example, in Arizona,
where all civil claims of less than $3000 must be submitted to arbitration, appeals are accorded de nova review in civil court. Amz. Rav. STAT. § 12-133(F) (Supp. 1977). See generally
31 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1316 (1956); 8 STAN. L. Rav. 410 (1956); see also M. BmRsTmN, PRIVATE
DIsPUTE SnrrLEmmNT 683-90 (1968). Under Nebraska's unique dispute settlement statute,
labor impasses between public employees and government employers are referred to the
Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations for resolution. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -838
(1974 & Cum. Supp. 1976). The court is considered an administrative body, School Dist. of
Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 785, 199 N.W.2d 752, 760 (1972),
and appeals therefrom are tried de novo, Nan. REv. STAT. § 48-812 (1974).
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NEW YORK: THE SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER SECTION

209 OF THE

TAYLOR

LAW

In 1974, section 209(4) of New York's Taylor Law, a part of the
state's Civil Service Law, was amended on an experimental basis to
provide for compulsory arbitration of disputes arising during collective bargaining negotiations between a municipality and its police
and firemen. 5 In contrast to its private sector precursor, section 716
of the New York Labor Law, 8 section 209 contains no provision for
judicial review. Although section 213(a) of the Civil Service Law97
stipulates that orders of the New York Public Employee Relations
Board (PERB) are reviewable pursuant to the procedures outlined
in article 78 of the CPLR,98 neither section 209 nor section 213(a)
expressly refers to awards granted by a compulsory arbitration
panel.
Article 78 of the CPLR provides the procedural framework for
review of administrative actions. The statute, which by its terms
incorporates both the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious tests, limits judicial review to the following considerations:
1. whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law; or
2. whether the body or officer proceeded . . . without or in
excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful
procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitraryand
capricious or an abuse of discretion.

. .;

or

4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing
held . . . is, on the entire record, supported by substantial
evidence.9

New York courts have grappled with the question whether the scope
of review for section 209 awards is properly delimited by article 78
or by article 75 as expanded by the court of appeals in Mount St.
Mary's. Indeed, a sharp divergence of opinion developed between
two of the judicial departments of the appellate division.
In Buffalo PBA v. City of Buffalo,"'° the New York Supreme
" Chs. 724, 725, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1122-28 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW
§ 209(4)) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (amending N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAw § 209 (McKinney 1973)).
The law expires by its own terms on July 1, 1977.
11N.Y. LABOR LAw § 716(6)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
17 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 213(a) (McKinney 1973).
9' N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7803 (McKinney 1974).

,Id.

(emphasis added).

1,081 Misc. 2d 172, 364 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1975) (mem.).
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Court, Erie County, concluded that the proper scope of review for
awards made pursuant to section 209 was specifically provided for
by reference to section 213 of the Taylor Law, which in turn mandates article 78 review. To reach this conclusion, the Buffalo PBA
court equated the award of a compulsory arbitration tribunal with
an order issued by PERB. 0'° This position found support in the
concurring opinion by Judge Fuchsberg to the New York Court of
Appeals decision in City of Amsterdam v. Helsby.1 °2 In discussing
the scope of review under section 209, Judge Fuchsberg stated that
a compulsory arbitration award issued pursuant to that statute "is
sufficiently administrative so as to come within the purview of article 78 review." ' 3 He indicated that in considering the proper scope
of review for a compulsory arbitration statute the court should focus
on the amount of power delegated by the legislature: "the desideratum should be safeguards proportionate to the grant; the larger the
grant, the greater the safeguards required." ' 4 The judge further
stated that review of compulsory arbitration awards, whether interest or grievance, must test both the substantiality of the evidence
and the degree of due process afforded the parties." 5
A contrary result was reached in Albany Permanent Professional FirefightersAssociation, Local 2007 v. Coming."' There, the
Supreme Court, Albany County, commenting on the proper scope
of review under section 209, stated:
[R]eview procedures of CPLR article 75, as modified by [Mount
St. Mary's] are appropriate ....
This means that the instant
award should be confirmed if it appears that in reaching their
determination the public arbitration panel considered those matters which the statute says they must consider and that their determination is supported by any evidence which was before them and,
therefore, has a rational basis.' °7
,0I Id. at 173, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
102 37 N.Y.2d 19, 28, 332 N.E.2d 290, 294, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring). In Helsby the court upheld the constitutionality of § 209(4) notwithstanding the
city's allegations that the statute violated the state's home rule provisions, contravened the
one man, one vote principle, and constituted an improper delegation of legislative power and
municipal power to tax. Id. at 27-28, 332 N.E.2d at 293-94, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 407-08.
,o Id. at 39, 332 N.E.2d at 301, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
Id. at 36, 332 N.E.2d at 299, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
" Id. at 40-41, 332 N.E.2d at 302, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
,08 84 Misc. 2d 759, 376 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975), aff'd, 51 App. Div.
2d 386, 381 N.Y.S.2d 699 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88
(1976).
1" 84 Misc. 2d at 761, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 799; accord, PBA v. City of New York, 52 App.
Div. 2d 43, 382 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1st Dep't 1976) (mem.), afg 173 N.Y.L.J. 123, June 26, 1975,
at 12, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
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In affirming the lower court's decision, the Appellate Division,
Third Department, explicitly rejected the contention that the compulsory arbitration award should be deemed an order of PERB.0 5
The court maintained that to allow an article 78 proceeding directly
against the arbitrators would place an undue burden upon them,
while a review based upon an expanded article 75 "would allow the
real adversaries to protect their own interests. 10 9
In contrast to the position adopted by the Third Department,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Caso v. Coffey,11 °
aligned itself with the Buffalo PBA court, holding that article 78
provides the proper scope of review for awards issued under section
209. The court emphasized that section 213 of the Taylor Law expressly provides for article 78 review."1 Since PERB is specifically
required to refer an unresolved dispute to compulsory arbitration
and no procedure exists for PERB to review the award, the court
decided that the compulsory arbitral panel should be treated as
12
PERB's surrogate and its award deemed an order of PERB.
The split within the judicial departments concerning the proper
scope of review under the Taylor Law was recently resolved by the
New York Court of Appeals in Caso v. Coffey,"' wherein the court
2's
210

51 App. Div. 2d at 390, 381 N.Y.2d at 702.
Id. Article 78 proceedings may be brought against a broad category of defendants,

including "every court, tribunal, board, corporation, officer, or other person, or aggregation
of persons, whose action may be affected by a proceeding under this article." N.Y. CirV. PRAC.
LAw § 7802(a) (McKinney 1963).
M 53 App. Div. 2d 373, 385 N.Y.S.2d 593 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d
683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976). In Coffey, the county sought to have an adverse compulsory
arbitration award reviewed under either article 75 or 78. The Supreme Court of Nassau
County ruled that article 78 provided the proper scope of review. Since compulsory arbitration affects property rights and is quasi-judicial in nature, the supreme court found the award
reviewable under the substantial evidence rule. Caso v. Coffey, 83 Misc. 2d 614, 372 N.Y.S.2d
892 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975). The court then remanded the case to the arbitrators for
the purpose of establishing a record. See note 122 infra. On rehearing the arbitration panel
increased the award for the policemen's union. The county again sought review, this time
basing its appeal upon article 78 alone. Since New York law provides that such actions are
transferable directly to the appellate division, the case was not relitigated at the supreme
court level. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7804(g) (McKinney 1963).
Mii
See 53 App. Div. 2d at 379-80, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 597, citing N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 213
(McKinney 1973).
21 53 App. Div. 2d at 382-83, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 599. The second department, unlike the
Coming court, saw "no problem in the fact that 'the panel consists of three individuals
serving on an ad hoc basis with no budget to defend its award' or that the real adversaries
would not necessarily be the parties in the appellate proceedings. Id. It concluded that "[a]
court of equity should have no difficulty resolving these matters since, if need be, independent
counsel to enforce or defend the award may be selected by PERB, and a nonjoined 'adversary'
may be added as a party to the proceeding." Id. (footnotes omitted).
11341 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d 683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976).
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reviewed the awards in both Coffey and Corning. Judge Fuchsberg,
writing for the court, made an abrupt about-face from his concurring opinion in City of Amsterdam,"' and declared that article 75,
as expanded by Mount St. Mary's, provides the preferred scope of
review under section 209.115 The court stated that "it is not the
PERB or the arbitration panel but the local governments and their
employees who are the real parties in interest; it is under article 75
procedure . . . that both parties in interest will be brought face to
face with one another as advocates of their respective positions."'' 6
In addition, Judge Fuchsberg noted, "[a]rticle 75 is our only statutory vehicle for the enforcement of arbitration.""'
After selecting article 75 as the appropriate means of review,
the court embarked upon a determination of the specific standard
of review to be applied in such an award. Judge Fuchsberg determined "that the essential function of these compulsory arbitration
panels [under section 209] is to 'write collective bargaining agreements for the parties.' "11 Since this is a quasi-legislative function," ' the court concluded that on judicial review the resultant
awards "are to be measured according to whether they are rational
or arbitrary and capricious in accordance with the principles articu2
lated in Mount St. Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood."'1
By selecting the arbitrary and capricious test as the standard
of review of a quasi-legislative activity, the court apparently was
reaffirming the distinction drawn in Mount St. Mary's between judicial review of interest and grievance arbitrations.121 Consequently,
the substantial evidence test, and not the arbitrary and capricious
See notes 102-105 and accompanying text supra.
41 N.Y.2d at 156, 359 N.E.2d at 685, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
Id. at 157, 359 N.E.2d at 685-86, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
"' Id. at 156-57, 359 N.E.2d at 685, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
"' Id.
at 158, 359 N.E.2d at 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (citations omitted).
"' Despite the detailed factors enumerated in § 209, the court stated that the panel must
nevertheless be afforded great latitude, elasticity, and discretion in reaching its decision. 41
N.Y.2d at 157-58, 359 N.E.2d at 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 90. Indeed, the court stressed that the
statutory criteria need only be "considered." The award itself, to be affirmed, must have
merely a rationale basis. Id..
Interestingly, in Helsby, in which the court had sustained the constitutionality of § 209,
Judge Fuchsberg had stated that he "did not find it useful to try to determine with precision
whether" the arbitral panel's power was legislative, judicial, or administraive. 37 N.Y.2d at
35, 332 N.E.2d at 298, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring). Rejecting the Mount
St. Mary's analsis in his Helsby concurrence, Judge Fuchsberg declared that he did not
believe the distinctions between interest and grievance arbitrations to be relevant to the issue
of scope of review. Id. at 40-41, 332, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
"a 41 N.Y.2d at 158, 359 N.E.2d at 686, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (citation omitted).
121 See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
"'
"'
"'
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the proper standard for judicial review
test, would still appear to be
22
of a grievance arbitration.
121See 41 N.Y.2d at 158, 359 N.E.2d at 687, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 92. Judicial demarcation of
interest and grievance arbitration may be further evidenced by the Coffey court's express
rejection of the substantial evidence test. Id. Interestingly, this bifurcation of the scope of
review is possible under article 78 as well as under "expanded" article 75. As the third
department suggested in Coming, review under both articles is functionally identical. 51 App.
Div. 2d at 389-90, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 701-02. Article 78 not only expressly mandates that a court
apply both the arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence tests when exercising its
power of review, but also categorizes each test as a separate inquiry. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw
§ 7803(3), (4) (McKinney 1963). The two tests are meant to be applied under different
circumstances, however, depending upon whether the administrative action involved is quasijudicial or discretionary. See Weintraub, Statutory Procedures GoverningJudicialReview of
Administrative Action: From State Writs to Article 78 of the Civil PracticeLaw and Rules,
38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 86, 123-24 (1963).
The court of appeals also disposed of a subsidiary problem which had been raised in both
Coffey and Coming, namely, the absence of a record of the arbitration proceeding for use in
judicial review. New York, unlike some states, see, e.g., Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, § 4,
1973 Mass. Acts 1135, reprinted in MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 9 app., at 320 (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1976); WASH. RIv. CODE § 41.56.450 (1974), does not require that a record or transcript
of the arbitration proceeding be maintained by the compulsory arbitration tribunal. The
problem created by this lapse was stated succinctly by the supreme court in Coffey when it
remarked:
Critical is the fact that there was no written record. Instead, the court has only an
unattractive mosaic of conflicting written and oral statements and affidavits, sophistical arguments and inconsistent, ambiguous and irreconciliable claims as to what
information and data was before the Panel on the crucial issue of ability to pay.
This forecloses meaningful judicial review since there can be no evaluation of
"substantiality" without a record.
83 Misc. 2d at 621, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900. Under the substantial evidence test, the record
is viewed as a whole. Kopec v. Buffalo Brake Works, 304 N.Y. 65,71, 106 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1952).
See Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 508, 260 N.E.2d 508, 516-17, 311
N.Y.S.2d 863, 875 (1970).
In addition to being indispensable for the proper application of the substantial evidence
test, a record would provide a body of precedent which would be useful in subsequent arbitration proceedings. This could be especially helpful in jurisdictions where minimal standards
are not provided for in the enabling statute. Cf. Hines, Mandatory ContractArbitrationIs It a Viable Process?, 25 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rav. 533 (1972) (continuity through precedents
necessary for compulsory arbitration). But cf. Communications, Mandatory ContractArbitration: A Viable Process or Not, It Works (Sometimes), 26 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rav. 1009
(1973) (role of arbitrator is to settle present dispute, not establish future guidelines). The
necessity of a full record under the arbitrary and capricious rule is not so apparent. An
accurate account, with written findings of facts which reveal the reasoning behind the decision, will sufffice to afford a basis for review. See Bowers & Cohen, Drafting Public Sector
Arbitration Legislation, 30 ARB. J. 253, 263 (1975). Nonetheless, a written record, indicating
why the arbitrators made the choice they did, will help effectuate the spirit of the arbitral
system. See Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 628, at B-14 (Oct. 20, 1975). To require a
verbatim transcript, however, might be objectionable because of the loss of informality,
Bowers & Cohen, supra at 259, and the inhibitive cost, PRoTEcTIVE SRvicEs, supra note 7, at
40 (speech by Ross Atwood). See also Lythgoe, On Improving Arbitration: The Transcript
Trauma, MONTHLY LAB. RaV. June 1974, at 47.
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CONCLUSION

As a result of the court of appeals' decision in Coffey, the question of the proper scope of review for compulsory arbitration awards
has been settled in New York. This decision will no doubt be
weighed by the New York Legislature when it considers whether to
extend section 209(4) of the Taylor Law beyond its current expiration date of July 1, 1977. Indeed, even if section 209 is reenacted
without change, continued inquiry into the scope of judicial review
of compulsory arbitration would appear to be both advisable and,
in light of the stakes involved, inevitable.
Compulsory arbitration is still in its infancy and doubtless will
continue to suffer growing pains. Its success will depend in great
part upon the formulation of an effective scope of judicial review.
In those states where judicial review is statutorily proscribed, courts
may well have to consider the more fundamental question whether
due process mandates a minimal level of review. In the past the
judiciary has been loath to go beyond its scrutiny of the constitutionality of the delegation of legislative power to arbitral panels.rs
In light of recent experience and case law, it seems clear that a
better defined role for the judiciary is in order.
The goal of compulsory arbitration is to arrive at a resolution
that the parties might have agreed to had they settled their dispute
themselves. The danger of minimal review is that it affords an arbitration panel excessive latitude in determining both the rights of the
parties compelled to arbitrate and the interests of the public. In
In Coffey, the court of appeals summarily dismissed the contention that there could be

no judicial review without a transcript of the arbitration proceeding. The court noted that
the city of Albany, in Coming, had declined to request that a record be kept, even after the

arbitrators had broached the subject. 41 N.Y.2d at 159, 359 N.E.2d at 687, 391 N.Y.S.2d at
92. Perhaps, in reaching its conclusion, the court was reaffirming former Chief Judge Fuld's

observation that compulsory arbitration was chosen by the legislature because it "would not
be hampered by the usual rules of evidence or the need to prepare a formal record." Mount
St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 512, 260 N.E.2d 508, 519, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863,
877-78 (1970) (Fuld, C.J., concurring). In any event, it is now apparently settled in New York
that the absence of a written record of the arbitral proceeding will not thwart judicial review.
'
See, e.g., Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv. & Hosp. Employees Local 113,
241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), wherein the court specifically declined to consider
whether due process mandates judicial review of compulsory arbitration, although it did

subject the challenged statute to due process scrutiny. The court stated that to satisfy constitutional requirements "a legislature

. . .

may not act arbitrarilyor unjustly and ordinarily

should provide a substantialand reasonable substitute for the [strike] rights withdrawn."
Id. at 539, 64 N.W.2d at 27 (emphasis in original). It is important to note that the statute

involved in Fairviewconcerns private voluntary hospitals, makes no provision for review, and
specifically states that the arbitrators' award is to be final and binding. MnuM. STAT. ANN. §
179.38 (1966). For a discussion of the case, see 39 MiNs. L. REv. 322 (1955).
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contrast, a system of compulsory arbitration with an overly broad
scope of judicial review would threaten the schema's raison d'etre,
its informality, expertise, speed, and most importantly, its finality.
Although it is possible that no means exists to balance the conflicting considerations, the states must reconsider and refine the role of
judicial review in the compulsory arbitration process.
Victor Cohen
Editor's Note. New York State's compulsory arbitration statute
was extended, with minor revisions, for another 2 years on June 7,
1977. Ch. 216, § 1, [1977] N.Y. Laws.

